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1. Disputed Borders
In one of the most bizarre turns of the ongoing Brexit ne-
gotiations, the British Overseas Territory Gibraltar and its
future status has becomeaboneof contention. The Span-
ish government is using the Brexit process to renew its
claim to the 6.7-square kilometer territory, and indeed
the dispute heated up quickly, with alleged violations of
territorial waters by the Spanish Navy (MacAskill & Jones,
2017), analogies to the Falklands War (Asthana, 2017),
and (deliberate) chaos at the border crossings (Agence
France-Presse, 2017). Similarly, the issue of Northern Ire-
land and the possible re-imposition of a “hard border”1
towards the Republic of Ireland in the wake of the Brexit
is troubling the EU. These territorial disputes remind us
that despite the purported stability of the nation-state
system, the issue of bordering, of ordering territory, is
still fraught with fragility and contention.
These Westphalian border disputes, which William
Walters (2002) described in his seminal work “the de-
naturalization of the border” as typical aspects of the “ge-
ographical border,” are characterized by a high degree of
symmetry, usually with two nation-state entities facing
off over disputed territory. In this article, however, we
want to focus on a different challenge to borders, namely
that posed by the movements of migration. This chal-
lenge is inherently different in character. For one, the
asymmetry and number of actors could not be starker.
For the other, the center of the challenge is not posses-
sion or control over bounded territory, but rather access
1 The term “hard border” has been used by various newspaper and media outlets to refer to the probable future configuration of the Irish–UK border,
e.g. O’Hagan (2017) in The Guardian, or Anonymous (2017) in The Telegraph. The Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary & Thesaurus (n.d.) defines
a hard border as “a border between countries that is strongly controlled and protected by officials, police, or soldiers, rather than one where people are
allowed to pass through easily with few controls.” Whether there is a co-semantic with the term “hard Brexit” can only be speculated, but the choice
of the term certainly points to the normality of invisible borders in the EU context, even if both the Republic of Ireland and the UK are not part of the
Schengen Area.
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to territory—it is the “biopolitical border” that is at stake
here (Walters, 2002). The issue at core is not the border-
ing of territory, but the ordering of populations, and their
different hierarchical positioning. To this end, the border
disputes of contemporary migration are already an indi-
cator of a post-Westphalian global order.2
However, both phenomena share the fragility, the
instability, the constant need of re-production of the
border through patches, “quick fixes” (Sciortino, 2004)
and border work on a daily basis. This has become bla-
tantly obvious through the “long Summer of Migration”
of 2015 (Kasparek & Speer, 2015), and the temporary col-
lapse of the European border regime and its fragile re-
stabilization since. The classical description of the events
of the 2015 and 2016 as a “refugee crisis” is mislead-
ing in several respects. For one, it was at its very core
a crisis of the border regime, while for the other, its as-
sumed temporality—the crisis as a strictly limited period
of time with a beginning and an end leading to a phase
of stabilization—is not empirically tenable.3
In contrast, we argue that the border, and especially
the European border regime, is structurally ridden bymo-
ments of crisis as its order is constantly contested by the
movements of migration, and that this contested and in-
herently unstable relationship between the border and
migration has to be put into the center of any analysis of
contemporary border theory. In order to underline this
perspective, wewill approach both the period before the
summer 2015 as well as its aftermath from the notion of
border conflict, i.e., through a perspective on the past
and present struggles and contestations in the context
of migration control at the borders of Europe. To this
end,wewant to analyze in this article: a)which processes
and dynamics led to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015;
and b) themultidimensional, hybrid, and at times contra-
dictory re-stabilization attempts that demonstrate that
the crisis of the border regime is not solved by draw-
ing on our recent research project in the Aegean region
and along the Balkan route.4 Even though the scope of
this article prevents us frompresenting our ethnographic
material in more detail, we nevertheless find the ethno-
graphic approach, meaning observing dynamics in situ
and in actu, indispensable for arriving at the conclusions
we present later.
2. From Border Work to Border Conflict
It is a common denominator of border studies to empha-
size the transformation of the border from a demarca-
tion line surrounding national territory to a ubiquitous,
techno-social, de-territorialized apparatus or regime pro-
ducing geographically stretched border spaces described
as “border zones,” “borderlands,” or “borderscapes.” At
the same time, these concepts include the idea of mo-
bile, fluid, selective, and differentiated border situations.
In this context, Balibar argues in favor of describing bor-
ders as “overdetermined, polysemic (that is to say that
borders never exist in the same way for individuals be-
longing to different social groups) and heterogeneous”
(cited in Salter, 2011, p. 67). There is thus also talk of
“mobile borders” (Kuster & Tsianos, 2013, p. 3) or “net-
worked borders” (Rumford, 2006, p. 153; Walters, 2004).
This shift not only induced a geographical refocus-
ing away from the level of the (nation) state, but also a
methodological reorientation with a focus on bordering
processes and practices, on doing border, “rather than
[on] the border per se” (Newman, 2006, p. 144; van Hou-
tum& van Naerssen, 2002, p. 126). The border is now be-
ing conceptualized as an effect of a multiplicity of agents
and practices, as becomes clear in the concept of “bor-
der work” (Rumford, 2008). The concept of border work
in particular draws attention to the everyday microprac-
tices of a wide range of actors. Following this perspec-
tive, “to border” is to be understood as a performative
act. Drawing on Judith Butler’s notion of performativity,
Marc Salter points to the fact that also “sovereignty, like
gender, has no essence, and must continually be articu-
lated and rearticulated in terms of ‘stylized repetition of
acts’ of sovereignty” (Salter, 2011, p. 66).
All these recent practice-oriented conceptualizations
indeed understand the border as an effect of a multi-
tude of actors and practices—human and non-human
alike. However, many of these constructivist approaches
still ignore the constitutive power of migration, or once
again conceptualize migrants as structurally powerless
and as ‘victims.’ The dominant focus of border studies,
especially those following the classical securitization ap-
proach looking at the function of the border as a barrier
or filter—to exclude people—also seemmostly to lead to
an epistemological exclusion of the agency of migrants.
By contrast, in their recently published volume Bor-
der as Method, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson
(2013) define borders as “social institutions, which are
marked by tensions between practices of border rein-
forcement and border crossing” (Mezzadra & Neilson,
2013, p. 3). Here, they employ the notion of border strug-
gles indicating the decisive role migration plays in co-
constituting the border.
This has many aspects in commonwith our approach
we labeled “ethnographic border regime analysis” as a
methodology to theorize the border from the perspec-
tive of the autonomy of migration (Transit Migration
2 Walters points to the fact that the different border typologies cannot be seen as historical clear-cut periods, but rather overlap to some extent and in
different degrees. For the colonial context, the border-drawing projects by the imperial powers were replete with the biopolitical rationality of order-
ing populations, whereas one could say that it was the age of decolonization and the formation of post-colonial nation states that brought about the
“geographical border.”
3 For an extended discussion of the various crises and notions of crisis especially in relation to Europe and recent events, please refer to New Keywords
Collective (2016).
4 In the context of a research project entitled “TransitMigration II: De- and restabilisations of the European border regime” (http://transitmigration-2.org),
funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, we carried out fieldwork in different countries of the Balkans, Greece, and Turkey fromApril to September 2016.
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Forschungsgruppe, 2007). This approach allows to look
at the border regime5 as a space of conflict and contes-
tation between the various actors trying to govern the
border and the movements of migration—without min-
imizing the border regime’s brutality. These conceptual-
izations represent a methodological and theoretical at-
tempt not only to think about the relationship between
migration movements and control regimes in a differ-
ent way than in the classical sociological way of object-
structure, but also to conceive of migration differently
than has previously been the dominant practice in the
cultural and social sciences—namely, not thinking about
it in the sense of a “deviation” from the paradigm of the
sedentary way of life in the modern nation state, or as
a functionalist variable of economic processes and ratio-
nalities. Instead, this theoretical and methodological ap-
proach represents an attempt to conceptualizemigration
both historically and also structurally as an act of “flight”
and as “imperceptible” forms of resistance, in the sense
of withdrawal and escape from miserable, exploitative
conditions of existence (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, &
Tsianos, 2008). Yann Moulier-Boutang (2006) described
this aspect as the “autonomy of migration.” This draws
attention to migration as a co-constitutive factor of the
border, with the forces of the movements of migration
challenging and reshaping the border every single day.
This perspective of putting migration central to the
analytical endeavor points to the intrinsic structural
fragility of the border regime. Crisis in this respect is not
reducible to a temporary anomaly or emergency situa-
tion, but insteadmust be seen as a central structural con-
dition for borders.
3. The EU as a New Border Laboratory, or Crisis as
Permanent Condition
The European Union can be regarded as a paradigmatic
laboratory of the border transformations described
above. With the Schengen agreement of 1985, the Euro-
pean project had heralded the creation of a continental
border regime, with the newly created notion of an “ex-
ternal border” as the pivotal mechanism and space for
migration control. The process resulted in the creation
of an “area of freedom, security and justice” through
the Treaty of Amsterdam and the parallel construction
of the European border regime as a fluid, multi-scalar
assemblage involving European Union agencies such as
Frontex (the European border and coast guard agency),
bodies of European law (like the Common European Asy-
lum System. CEAS), processes of standardizations and
harmonizations especially in the field of border manage-
ment (called “Integrated Border Management”), a grow-
ing military-industrial-academic complex largely funded
by the EU (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013), alongsidemore tra-
ditional national apparatuses of migration control that
had evolved since the 1970s and a flexible involvement
of IGOs (international and intergovernmental organiza-
tions, such as the UNHCR or the IOM).
If there is one central rationale at the core of the Eu-
ropean border regime, it is driven by what Lahav and
Guiraudon (2000) have called the fundamental “control
dilemma”. Culminating in the creation of the EU internal
market, this dilemma refers to the question how to rec-
oncile a neoliberal economic paradigm of a—preferably
global—free circulation of goods, services, and capital
with a continued biopolitical will to control the move-
ments of people.
In regards to the border regime, the main practical
answer to the control dilemma was, according to Lahav
and Guiraudon (2000), to move border controls “away
from the border and outside the states,” leading to the
described new spacialisation and geographical expan-
sion of the border. In addition, there existed a techno-
scientific vision of a ‘smart,’ invisible yet selective border
that itself is able to distinguish between bona fide trav-
elers and unwanted migrants (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2008). To this end, broadly speaking
four paradigms were enacted within the European bor-
der regime. First, to the outside, a paradigm of “remote
control” and externalization (Bialasiewicz, 2012; Hess &
Tsianos, 2007; Lavenex, 2004; Zolberg, 2006). Second, as
already indicated, a paradigm of a fortified, yet smart
external border through technology, digitalization and
biometrization (Broeders, 2007; Dijstelbloem & Meijer,
2011; Kuster & Tsianos, 2013).
While these two dimensions have been extensively
studied by border studies, there is also a third one,
namely an internal regime steeped in the institution of
asylum and put into practice through the Dublin/Eurodac
regulations, aiming at the immobilization of migrant pop-
ulations within the European territory (Borri & Fontanari,
2016; Kasparek, 2016a; Picozza, 2017; Schuster, 2011). Fi-
nally, fourth, especially in recent years, we can observe an
increasing humanitarization of the border (Cuttitta 2014;
Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Walters 2011). This has acceler-
ated in the context of the growing number of shipwrecks
and subsequent deaths in the Mediterranean in recent
years. However, the humanitarian discourse dates fur-
ther back, to a white paper by former British Prime Min-
ister Anthony Blair from the year 2002, entitled “Secure
Border, Safe Haven” (HomeOffice, 2002) that strongly ap-
pealed to a humanitarian discourse and ethics.6 However,
only in 2013 and in light of two major disasters resulting
in nearly 500 deaths off the coast of Lampedusa did hu-
5 Weemploy the concept of “regime” in a Foucauldian sense to indicate themultiple levels and dimensions at play constituting the “border” as a dynamic
and somehow contingent apparatus based on laws and regulations, institutions, techniqual devices, moral beliefs and representations, discourses, ac-
tors, and practices (Kasparek & Hess, 2014; Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe, 2007).
6 Also in the context of the first Transit Migration research project in the early 2000s, we could infer processes that we called “NGOisation” and a “gov-
ernmentalization of politics,” pointing to the fact that the expansion of the border regime not only functioned by means of “security”-actors, but
particularly operated via specific appeal to and articulation of humanitarian positions, such as in the field of anti-trafficking policies and in the context
of asylum (Hess & Karakayali, 2007).
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manitarianism become an apparatus (i.e., a Foucauldian
dispositif ) in its own right.
This fourfold architecture of the European border
regime broke down in summer and autumn 2015, tem-
porarily collapsing when confronted by a new charac-
teristic—that of increased arrivals of migrants. In the
end, this challenged not only the European Union’s bor-
der and migration regime, but the EU and the European
project as a whole.
4. An Announced Crisis
The advent of a quantitatively and qualitatively new level
of migration to Europe in the summer of 2015 caught
the European governments by surprise.7 Despite indica-
tions dating back to 2011 that warned of such a rise
in numbers, European and nation-state institutions did
not respond in time, e.g. regarding an adequate emer-
gency response along the Balkan route or reception facil-
ities. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring in early 2011,
the parameters of a pan-European regulation of its bor-
ders have shifted quite drastically. External events accel-
erated by the ongoing Syrian civil war and mass refugee-
migration movements in the direct neighborhood of Eu-
rope, as well as internal EU and European developments
(especially in the legal systems of the EU), have led to se-
vere fragility of the border regime and have undermined
several of the above outlined paradigms.8 In the follow-
ing, we briefly outline three main external and internal
processes leading up to the developments in 2015.
4.1. The Arab Spring and the Breakdown of Externalization
The ongoing crisis of the European border regime can-
not be understood without analyzing it in a double re-
lationship with the social and democratic uprisings that
started in North Africa 2011. While the uprisings had al-
ready strongly destabilized the Euro-Mediterranean bor-
der regime as established in the years before 2011, their
more long-term consequence was destabilization of the
European Union itself.
Prior to the Arab Spring, the European border regime
stretching towards Africa was built heavily on the ex-
ternalization paradigm. Through diverse processes such
as the Barcelona Process, initiated as far back as 1995,
or the Rabat process of 2006 and the Mediterranean
Transit Migration Dialogue, dating back to 2007, many
North and West African countries were to some degree
involved in the European Union’s migration and border
management project. Its different componentswere usu-
ally driven by EU Member States, with the backing and
support of Brussels.
The Spanish government was more or less in charge
of dealingwith thewesternMediterranean transit routes
and rather successfully included transit countries likeMo-
rocco and even further south, Senegal and Mauretania,
in its migration control policies (Domínguez-Mujica, Díaz-
Hernández, & Parreno-Castellano, 2014).9 In the central
Mediterranean, the central driver, Italy, faced stronger
obstacles than Spain. Throughout the first decade of the
21st century, Italy had sought an agreement with Libya,
in which the latter would stop the departure of migrants
towards the former, and would readmit migrants from
there. Under the 2008 Italian–Libyan friendship treaty, a
secret protocol created the conditions for the external-
ization of migration control. Soon after it entered into
effect in May 2009, Italy commenced pushback opera-
tions towards Libya outside of Italian territorial waters
(Bialasiewicz, 2012; Heimeshoff, Hess, Kron, Schwenken,
& Trzeciak, 2014).
Immediately after the successful initial uprising in
Tunisia, the Tunisian interim government canceled its co-
operation with Italy, and no longer continued preventing
migrants’ vessels fromdeparting from its coast. In the fol-
lowing months, around 30,000 Tunisians arrived in Italy
(Cuttitta, 2016). This new quality of migration as well as
the ensuing conflicts within the Schengen system were
already indicative of the instability to come, even though
both aspects were rather short-lived at that time. Subse-
quently, the Schengen border law was amended in 2013,
granting a provision that in times of the arrival of large
migrations, internal border controls could be reinstated
for a certain period.
With the outbreak of the Libyan civil war in Febru-
ary 2011 and the subsequent NATO intervention, Italian–
Libyan cooperation also ended. By the end of 2011, the
externalized border regime in the Mediterranean had
significant gaps. The number of migrants crossing the
Mediterranean by boat started to rise sharply, and has
continued to do so ever since, despite ongoing efforts
and attempts by the EU and Member States to reestab-
lish cooperation with the different northern African
regimes, such as the military-led government of Egypt,
or Libya (Heller & Pezzani, 2016).
A legal development dating back to 2009 created fur-
ther obstacles to the return to the previous status quo.
7 This can for example be evidenced by the annual risk analysis (ARA) of the European border agency Frontex. The agency is tasked with forecasting
irregular migration at Europe’s borders through a specialized risk analysis model. However, the ARA for 2015, published in April 2015, does not predict
a considerable rise in detections of irregular entries compared 2014, with 280.000 irregular entries detected, and continues to assume that the Central
Mediterranean route between Libya Italy will remain the main entry route to the EU (Frontex, 2015).
8 In addition to these external and internal political dynamics, there is also a societal dynamic to be addressed that led—in most western European
countries—to a normalization of the acceptance of the fact that they were countries of immigration, while post-migrational cultural and societal dy-
namics becamemoremainstream. This holds especially true for Germany. After years of ardent denial of being a country of immigration, Germany over
the past few years officially turned to a new paradigm of a proclaimed “culture of welcoming” (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016).
9 As early as the late 1990s, the Spanish government succeeded in integrating Morocco into its migration management project, even if events such as
in Ceuta and Melilla in October 2005, when hundreds of migrants managed to scale the fences and enter Spanish territory, constituted bumps in the
road.With the active support and financing of the newly created European border agency Frontex, Spain also managed to inhibit migratory movements
towards the Canary Islands.
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After the commencement of the Italian pushback prac-
tice towards Libya, a group of migrants subjected to the
operations sued the Italian state which became famous
asHirsi et al. vs. Italy (ECHR, 2012) at the European Court
of Human Rights. Since Libya could not be considered a
“Safe Third Country” for refugees, the Court ruled that
the Italian pushback operations constituted a violation
of the Geneva Convention’s non-refoulement principle.
This specific case had deep implications for the practices
of the Europeanmigration and border regime. While not
an unsurpassable obstacle to externalization, the ECHR’s
verdict created a legal limit to such measures.
4.2. The Crisis of Dublin
With externalization and ‘remote control’ increasingly
failing in the eastern and centralMediterranean, the EU’s
internal system for mobility control of asylum seekers
and refugees came under increased pressure. As a com-
plement to externalization, the creation of the Common
European Asylum System, after the Treaty of Amster-
dam, established an internal mobility regime (Kasparek,
2016a) for third-country nationals without residency per-
mits or visas, with the Dublin and the Eurodac regula-
tions as central components. The Dublin system deals
with the question which European state has the obliga-
tion to process an asylum application. It is explicitly not
a quota system, but instead assigns this responsibility
according to different criteria, the country of first entry
being the most prominent. In practice, this meant that
the Member States situated on the EU’s external border
were obliged to process themajority of applications. The
implementation of these rules was predicated on the Eu-
rodac database, in which the fingerprints of all appre-
hended migrants were stored.
Member States situated on the external border such
as Greece, Italy, Malta, and Cyprus had begun arguing
around 2008 that this mechanism was to their disadvan-
tage and lobbied for intra-European reallocation of asy-
lum seekers.10 These attempts were largely unsuccessful.
The revision of Dublin in 2013 (Dublin III) and the pro-
posed Dublin IV regulation do not depart from the “coun-
try of first entry” rule. The political conflict aroundDublin
thusmoved to the area of implementation. The EUMem-
ber Statesmost affected all started tomove towards a lax
fingerprint registration practice, thus beginning to under-
mine the effectiveness of the Dublin system.
Dublin also constituted a large problem for refugees
andmigrants.Manymigrants start their journey knowing
where they want to go, due to transnational networks
of information and social relations that make certain
places in Europe more desirable as end destinations. In
this way, many migrants ignore the Dublin rule and start
so-called “secondary movements” towards other desti-
nations (Borri & Fontanari, 2016). This not only started
to clog the Dublin bureaucracy, but had a spillover ef-
fect into the national and European judiciaries; migrants,
threatened with intra-European deportation, petitioned
for protection, citing the deteriorating asylum standards
in the Southern EU Member States as an argument for
their case.
An earlier judgement by the European Court of
Human Rights in 2011, MSS vs. Belgium and Greece
(ECHR, 2011), had marked the preliminary apogee of
the breakdown of the Dublin system. Citing the virtual
non-existence of an asylum system, and the resulting ap-
palling living conditions for asylum seekers in Greece, the
court found both Greece and Belgium (which had sought
to deport the plaintiff) to be guilty of human rights vi-
olations. This judgement not only effectively excluded
Greece from the Dublin system, but also destroyed the
fiction of a homogeneous asylum system in the European
Union. In 2012, the European Court of Justice followed
suit and reinforced this consequence.More andmore EU
Member States came under scrutiny (Kasparek & Speer,
2013), while the reform of the CEAS in 2013 did nothing
to rectify this situation.
4.3. Lampedusa and the Humanitarization of the Border
While the discussions on the Dublin crisis and the legal
interpretations of the applicability of international law
extra-territorially were largely confined to experts, the
volatility of the European migration and border regime
was brought into sharp focuswith back-to-back tragedies
that occurred in October 2013 in Lampedusa. Within
the space of a few days, two shipwrecks resulted in the
deaths of nearly 500 people. While these were not the
first, nor the last, they captured the attention of the Euro-
pean public in an unprecedentedmanner. The legitimacy
of restrictive border controls was severely called into
question not only by a liberal public but by prominent
members of the European Commission, such as Home
Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, and the Presi-
dent of the Commission, JoséManuel Barroso (Kasparek,
2015; Ticktin, 2015).
However, while on the EU level there was a decisive
discursive shift towards a humanitarian rationale that pri-
oritized the saving of lives at sea, in the immediate after-
math no decisive policy shift was discernible.11 The Ital-
10 See, for example, the paper “Combating illegal immigration in the Mediterranean” by the Cyprus, Greek, Italian and Maltese Delegations circulated at
the informal meeting of the JHA Ministers held in Prague on 15 January 2009. In the paper, the so-called “Quadro Group” (Group of Four) reaffirmed
the general direction of the European migration and border policies, only then to stress that “[a]s a matter of principle Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta
prefer a more formalized approach to intra-EU reallocation in the longer term which may also include asylum seekers, although at present the utmost
priority is to start implementing intra-EU reallocation under existing arrangements as early as possible” (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 7).
11 Only five days after the first shipwreck, the European Council initiated a “Task Force Mediterranean” that, under the leadership of Cecilia Malmström,
worked on a reform program, e.g. envisioning humanitarian visas and other humanitarian, legal channels to facilitate entry into the EU. However, as
a team of journalists could show, this reform paper never reached the public due to strong criticisms, especially by the German Minister of Interior
(Gebauer et al., 2015).
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 58–68 62
ian government’s decision to initiate the Mare Nostrum
operation proved to be more decisive, as, for the first
time, a national government reframed its border policies,
putting the saving of lives before the securing of borders
(Cuttitta, 2014). However, the increased arrival of mi-
grants placedmore stress on the Dublin system and regis-
tration practices in Italy slowed down severely. European
Union pressure to replace Mare Nostrum with a mission
to police the borders led to its substitutionwith Frontex’s
Operation Triton, which again reprioritized secure bor-
ders over the lives of humans. This turn, however, was
itself short-lived as another tragedy struck in April 2015.
Costing nearly 800 people their lives at sea, the disaster
put the humanitarian rationale squarely back on the ta-
ble and underlined oncemore that the EU border regime
needed to take a decisive step if it wanted to stay on top
of developments. This was felt by the Commission, which
released a portion of its upcoming “European Agenda on
Migration” beforehand as the so-called “Ten-Point Plan”
(European Commission, 2015b) stressing the necessity to
reinforce Frontex operations in the Mediterranean, urg-
ing a deployment of a navy mission (EUNAVFOR Med)
against smugglers and already hinting at improved coop-
eration of EU agencies.
5. Re-stabilization? Dimensions of a Post-2015 Border
Regime
In the last section, we argued that by 2015, the Euro-
pean border regime was straining under different types
of pressures, i.e., newmovements of migration, external
and internal developments, and political and legal pro-
cesses. The collapse of 2015 was inevitable. In this sec-
tion, we will show that from the perspective of the no-
tion of border (as) conflict, this dynamic did not come to
an end. In fact, Giuseppe Sciortino’s description of the
main characteristic of the border regime as being struc-
turally “a result of continuous repair work through prac-
tices” (Sciortino, 2004) was never as to-the-point as in
the year 2015 and onwards.
In May 2015, the Commission presented its central
policy document, the European Agenda on Migration
(EAM) (European Commission, 2015a), which attempted
to address the obvious shortcomings of the previous years
and relaunch a dynamic of Europeanization of migration
and border policies that had been lost. However, even this
move turned out to be at least one step behind develop-
ments, since the arrivals on the Aegean islands, and the
number of people organizing their transit from Greece,
through the Balkans, and towards Central andWestern Eu-
rope, were already rising sharply, culminating in the tem-
porary collapse of the European border regime in Septem-
ber 2015. The movements and following reactions by the
diverse actors overwhelmed the European Agenda and its
policy rationales almost overnight. For the answer to the
structural crisis of the European border regime, the Com-
mission had given in the EAMwasmore Europe,more cen-
tralized competencies, and more harmonization.
This is most evident in a strategic proposal labeled
the “hotspot approach” (European Commission, 2015a,
p. 6). In this approach, the Commission posited the de-
ployment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO),
Frontex, Eurojust, and Europol to the hotspots of mi-
gration, namely parts of the border perceived as espe-
cially under migratory pressure, in order to “swiftly iden-
tify, register and fingerprinting incoming migrants” (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2015a, p. 6). After registration and
identification, migrants were to be separated into appro-
priate channels. Redistribution (relocation)within the EU
for some, access to the national asylum system for oth-
ers, special care for those found to be vulnerable, and
deportation for the rest (and possibly most).
Even though the hotspot approach first of all pledged
support to the EU Member States most affected by mi-
gration, it was clearly designed to address the crisis of
the Dublin regulation, by means of close supervision
of the procedures by EU agencies. This intervention of
European agencies at the borders of Europe heralded
a new mode of Europeanization, as it aims at trans-
ferring central competences towards Brussels, but the
EAM confines this transfer to scenarios of crisis and
exception and does not necessarily aim at normalizing
this transfer (Kasparek, 2016b). On the other hand, ge-
nealogically, the hotspot approach also draws on the
idea of the externalized “Transit Processing Centres” pro-
posed in 2003 by the UK’s Prime Minister, Anthony Blair
(Blair, 2003). While the latter were supposed to be sit-
uated outside the EU’s territory, the problem-ridden ex-
ternalization process as described above prompted a ge-
ographical shift inwards, towards the very border of the
EU (Antonakaki, Kasparek, & Maniatis, 2016; Kuster &
Tsianos, 2016).
Since March 2016, we have been confronted across
the board with multidimensional re-bordering efforts by
the EU and its agencies, as well as by different Euro-
pean states; this has resulted in highly regionalized, am-
bivalent, and hybrid securitarian-humanitarian regimes.
These occasionally frenzied efforts were often aided by
a notion of a ‘state of emergency,’ especially along the
Balkan route (Fassin, 2012; Kasparek, 2016b). The accom-
panying notions of exception have determined the re-
stabilization of the EU border regime up to today. This
makes it possible to systematically undermine the stan-
dards of international and European law without seri-
ous challenges. Indeed, in various instances, we have ob-
served carefully designed policy elements, which we call
“anti-litigation devices,” in the wake of the drastic con-
sequences the rulings of the ECHR had had for the Euro-
pean border regime. The design of theHungarian “transit
zones” as the only border crossing points for fleeing mi-
grants is a striking case. They are an elementary part of
the border fence towards Serbia, and allow for the fiction
that the border has not been closed for those seeking
international protection, but rather that their admission
numbers are merely limited due to administrative rea-
sons: each of the two transit zones arbitrarily opens its
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gate for approximately 15 asylum seekers to enter Hun-
gary every day on a highly arbitrary basis (Beznec, Speer,
& StojićMitrović, 2016). The resumption of Dublin depor-
tations to Greece in March 2017 follows a similar logic,
where specially assigned EASO officers in Greece are to
guarantee that the human rights of the Dublin returnees
will not be violated in a manner which could lead to new
condemnations by the ECHR.
Themain event structuring the current statuswas the
entering into force of what is called the EU–Turkey deal
in March 2016, pushed primarily by the Commission and
theGerman government anddrawing on the paradigmof
externalization. In short, Turkey agreed to stop irregular
border crossings towards the Greek Aegean islands, and
to allow for the readmission of all migrants that had ar-
rived on these islands after the signing of the deal due
to Turkey being labeled both a “safe third country” as
well as a prospective “country of first asylum” for Syrians.
In return, the EU offered substantial financial assistance
to improve the situation for Syrian refugees in Turkey, as
well as the resettlement to the EU of one Syrian refugee
for every Syrian deported to Turkey from Greece, the so-
called 1:1 procedure (Heck & Hess, 2016).
The actual implementation of the deal, however, has
not been that straightforward. Returns to Turkey, and re-
settlement to the EU, have so far been slow.12 The only
element that seems to be working is a sharp decline in
border crossings, which may in part also be attributed
to the deterring effect of being stuck on a Greek island.
The deal, in conjunction with the hotspot system set up
on the islands, has led to massive respatialisation follow-
ing the “excision” of the islands from the European and
Greek asylum system. Also here akin to the Pacific solu-
tion (Devetak, 2004), the islands are used as spatially suit-
able sites for a creative exclusion of migrants from rights,
similar to what AlisonMountz (2011) has described as an
“enforcement archipelago.” In combinationwith the deal,
the hotspot system has been turned into a machine for
the denial of asylum. As we learned from interviews with
officials from both EASO and the Hellenic Asylum Service
in Chios during our fieldwork, both agencies understand
that it is their task to prove, in each individual case, that
the person that has arrived on the island and has made
an asylum application is a) inadmissible in the Greek asy-
lum system and b) can be readmitted to Turkey. Here
again, we detect an anti-litigation device: Since most asy-
lum applications are deemed inadmissible after an indi-
vidual assessment of the case, the ban on collective ex-
pulsions from the Geneva Convention is circumvented.
But this systematic disenfranchisement and under-
mining of the right of asylum finds its continuation in
Turkey due to several dynamics and contradictory legal
provisions that not only burden Turkey with the task of
being the watchdog for the European Union and turn it
more and more into a country of highly precarious im-
migration; as our field research has also shown that the
effects of the deal led to a virtual collapse of the more-
or-less UNHCR-based asylum system at Turkey itself. Al-
though Turkey is labeled as a “first country of asylum”
by the EU-Turkey deal, it still applies a geographical lim-
itation to the 1951 Geneva Convention, which means it
only accepts European citizens as “convention refugees.”
All non-Europeans have to apply to the UNHCR in order
to receive refugee status and becoming eligible for re-
settlement, which in many cases lasts up to six or even
more years (Soykan, 2012). According to one lawyer we
met, more than 250,000 recognized refugees are cur-
rently waiting in Turkey to be resettled. However, Syrian
refugees are excluded from these status altogether. They
have no right to seek asylum; instead they have been
granted a “temporary protection status” by the Turkish
government that puts them in an extremely precarious
legal and social condition (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel, 2016).
However, in 2013, UNHCR also suspended asylum appli-
cations fromAfghans, citing a backlog of cases. According
to our conversation partners, due to the tremendous in-
crease of asylum seekers, the UNHCRmight consider sus-
pending the applications of all nationalities and restrict
the resettlement to vulnerable cases.
Domestically, the deal gave the AKP government the
power to use the Syrian presence as a biopolitical card
to play in the context of its internal conflicts, which are
heavily coded in ethnic and religious ways (Heck, Hess, &
Genç, submitted). This shows clearly that the externaliza-
tion policy has had a boomerang effect and has produced
uncontrollable dependencies for the European Union.
6. Conclusion
The dynamics of the European border regime which
we have paradigmatically described in this paper re-
main conflicted. It is not yet possible to argue conclu-
sively which direction the development of the Euro-
pean border regime, and thus the European project as
a whole, will take. Nevertheless, we will formulate tenta-
tive conclusions.
The first is concerned with what we have called the
gravitational center of the European border regime. If
the EAM was designed to firmly place the Commission
in this center, that particular attempt has been thwarted
by the subsequent developments of the Summer of Mi-
gration. While the efforts of the Commission to maintain
their various initiatives, such as the relocation mecha-
nism and the hotspot approach, can only be described
as diligent, the initiative yet again lies with the Council
these days, which has not been able to find a consensus
on the central problems of 2015—the crisis of Dublin and
a “fair distribution” scheme.
The second concerns fragmentation. This obviously
applies to a geographical and geopolitical context. Both
outside as well as inside the EU, the influence of the EU
has decreased, and new regional centers of powers with
12 As of June 9, 2017, 20,869 people have been relocated within the EU, and 22,504 have been relocated from Turkey to the EU (European Commission,
2017).
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divergent interests are emerging, be it the countries of
the VisegradGroup or post-coup Turkey. Also on the level
of rights, the analysis of fragmentation applies as well. It
is not only the Brexit process that has underlined that
the vision of European citizenship, i.e., a homogeneous
landscape of post-national rights throughout the EU, has
failed. This is especially true for those that have from the
start been excluded from EU citizenship. Most dramatic,
this fragmentation of rights applies to the fringes of Eu-
rope, precisely to theAegean islands,where a population
has been systematically rendered “deportable” (De Gen-
ova & Peutz, 2010), even if the actual mass deportations
have not yet happened. While the bodies could not be
kept external to the EU, their exteriority is re-produced
in the hotspot centers, where deportation to Turkey un-
der the terms of the deal serves as a deterrence.
In this, the fence constructions and severely deter-
ring laws criminalizing border crossing via the northern
Balkan EU states like Hungary and Croatia seem to have
effectively blocked the Balkan route and—similarly to
the deal’s effects on the Greek Islands—are transform-
ing Serbia into a buffer zone and waiting room without
any proper asylum or migration system in place. More-
over, the EU–Turkey deal has entered into its second year
and seems to be amore durable and institutionalized pol-
icy than many commentators thought in the beginning.
However, the number of crossings in the CentralMediter-
ranean continue to stay at a high level, showing that the
struggles of migration are not coming to an end. Instead,
the most recent attempts by Italian prosecutors to crim-
inalize the civil society rescue missions clearly show that
the conflicts on the very meaning of border crossing and
the permeability of the border still continue. Bordering
territory and ordering populations has always been im-
buedwith violence and resistance, while the space of the
border knows no single monopoly of power.
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